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A fundamental distinction in scientific analyses of behavior is that between approach 
motivation and avoidance motivation. Approach motivation represents energization by and/or 
physical or psychological direction toward an incentive or reward (i.e., an appetitive object, 
event, possibility), whereas avoidance motivation represents energization by and/or physical or 
psychological direction away from a threat or punishment (i.e., an aversive object, event, 
possibility; Elliot, 2008a). This distinction between approach and avoidance motivation has been 
present in scholarly thought for millennia (since Democritus, 460-370 B.C.E.) and in scientific 
psychology since the advent of the discipline in both Europe (Wundt, 1887) and the United 
States (James, 1890). It is popular in the contemporary psychological literature, as illustrated by 
the recent publication of edited books and journal special issues (Eder, Elliot, & Harmon-Jones, 
in press; Elliot, 2008b; Ryan, 2006). It is being applied to many different types of psychological 
constructs and phenomena, and it is being operationalized in myriad ways in diverse areas of 
inquiry. In short, the approach-avoidance motivational distinction is long-lasting and generative. 
A considerable amount of research has been conducted in the past two decades on the 
implications of approach and avoidance motivation, especially in achievement and social 
contexts and in the context of pursuing personal goals for daily life. Much of this literature has 
focused specifically on avoidance motivation, as manipulated by environmental cues and as 
assessed via self-reported goal commitments. The extant research suggests that avoidance 
motivation is beneficial for some types of tasks (e.g., those requiring low-level persistence, 
vigilant attention to detail, and minimal mental manipulation; De Dreu, Bass, & Nijstad, 2008;  
Elliot & Aarts, 2011; Freidman & Förster, 2002; Koch, Holland, & Van Knippenberg, 2008; 
Roskes, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2012), for certain types of life situations (e.g., when one seeks to 
quite smoking; Suls & Fletcher, 1985; Worth, Sullivan, Hertel, & Rothman, 2005), and in the 
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short run (Freund, 2006; Heckman et al., 2004). However, the research also indicates that 
avoidance motivation often has negative consequences for performance and well-being 
outcomes, particularly for tasks requiring flexible cognition and mental manipulation (Elliot & 
Church, 1997; Freidman & Förster, 2005; Hembree, 1988; Maier, Elliot, & Lichtenfeld, 2008; 
Mehta & Zhu, 2009), and especially in the long run (Gable, 2006; Roskes et al., 2012; Tamir & 
Deiner, 2008).  
In the present article, we consider why avoidance motivation often has inimical 
consequences, focusing on the affective, cognitive, and behavioral processes commonly evoked 
by such motivation. The central emphasis of the present chapter is on the link between avoidance 
motivation and the depletion of the self’s executive resources. We will lay out the reasons to 
expect a link between these two concepts, and then overview some recent research that indirectly 
and directly supports this relation.1  
Avoidance motivational processes 
As noted above, avoidance motivation represents energization and/or direction with 
regard to a threat or punishment. Accordingly, in avoidance motivation, an aversive object, 
event, or possibility serves as the centerpiece or hub of self-regulation. This structural aspect of 
avoidance motivation has a number of important implications.  
 First, the inherent focus on an aversive object, event, or possibility in avoidance 
regulation evokes a host of problematic psychological processes. These processes include: 
affective processes such as anticipatory worry, ongoing emotionality, and hyper-reactivity to 
negative feedback (Elliot & McGregor, 1999; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007; 
Gable, Reis, & Elliot, 2000); perceptual-cognitive processes such as enhanced likelihood of 
threat appraisals, heightened vigilance for and adherence to negative information, and difficulty 
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sustaining focus due to distracting self-worth concerns (Covington, 1992; Derryberry & Reed, 
2008; Elliot & Reis, 2003; Urdan & Midgley, 2001); and behavioral processes such as 
overstriving to ensure that negative outcomes are avoided, selecting easy tasks in which failure is 
not possible, and withdrawing effort to protect oneself from demonstrating low ability (Alicke & 
Sedikides, 2009; Elliot & Church, 2003; Murray, Derrick, Leder, & Holmes, 2008; Righetti, 
Finkenauer, & Rusbult, 2011). Second, the aforementioned processes are often experienced as 
particularly urgent and all-consuming, given that, perceptually, “bad is stronger than good” 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenaur, & Vohs, 2001; David, Green, Martin, & Suls, 1997).  
Third, evading an aversive object, event, or possibility is not something that individuals 
typically feel intrinsically drawn to or excited about, but instead is something that one feels 
externally forced or internally pressured to do. As such, avoidance regulation is commonly 
experienced as a requirement or obligation -- something one must do, rather than something one 
gets to do (Carver, Sutton, & Scheier, 2000; Elliot & Sheldon, 1998; Higgins, 1997; Ryan & 
Deci, 2006). Fourth, avoidance motivation provides the person with something to move or stay 
away from, but it does not provide the person with something to move toward. Thus, avoidance 
motivation does not provide specific guidance in a concrete direction that can both help one 
make progress and yield a clear and satisfying sense of progress (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Elliot, 
Sheldon, & Church, 1997). Fifth, the structure of avoidance motivation only allows one to at best 
avoid the absence of an aversive outcome, it does not allow one to accomplish the presence of a 
desired outcome. Accordingly, the most gratifying experience that one can have upon 
successfully enacting avoidance motivation is the feeling of relief, rather than the joy and 
excitement of successfully enacting approach motivation (Carver, 2006 Higgins, Shah, & 
Friedman, 1997). Poignantly stated, avoidance motivation merely allows one to survive, as it 
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does not yield the type of positive psychological experiences needed to truly thrive and develop 
to one’s full capacity (Elliot, 2006; McFarland & Miller, 1994). In sum, the very nature of 
avoidance motivation would appear to place inherent limits on its effectiveness and would seem 
likely to exact a heavy toll on the motivated individual. Before elaborating on this point, we 
provide a brief overview of the notion of executive resources and their depletion.  
Executive resources and their depletion 
The self has several functions, one of which is the executive function. The executive 
function of the self is the active agent that “makes decisions, initiates actions, and in other ways 
exerts control over both self and environment (Baumeister, 1998, p. 712). It is the aspect of the 
self that engages in the self-regulation of behavior. Several models of self-regulation contend 
that the executive function relies on a common, limited, depletable pool of cognitive and 
volitional resources (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Cavallo, Holmes, 
Fitzsimons, Murray, & Wood, 2012; Hirst & Kalmar, 1987; Inzlicht, McKay, & Aronson, 2006; 
Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Schmader & Johns, 2003; Schmeichel, 2007; Vohs & Heatherton, 
2000). Engaging in an act of self-regulation is posited to require cognitive capacity and volitional 
energy, and this capacity/energy expenditure temporarily diminishes the amount of 
capacity/energy available for subsequent acts of regulation. Accordingly, a self-regulatory act 
that consumes capacity/energy from the limited available pool is posited to place the individual 
in a state of resource depletion (i.e., “ego depletion;” Baumeister et al., 1998, p. 1252). 
A rapidly expanding body of empirical work is accumulating in support of this resource 
depletion model of the executive function of the self (for reviews, see Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 
2007; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010; Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012). The paradigm 
used in a large portion of this research, the “two-task” paradigm, is as follows: Participants 
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engage in one act of self-regulation, such as managing their impulses or controlling their 
thoughts, and then engage in a second self-regulation task, such as solving challenging 
intellectual problems or persisting at a hand-grip activity. The common finding in this work is 
that performance on the second task is impaired, which is consistent with the notion that 
performance on the initial task depleted resources from a common pool that were no longer 
available when the second task was performed (Baumeister et al., 1998; Fischer, Greitemeyer, & 
Frey, 2008; Freeman & Muraven, 2010; Johns, Inzlicht, & Schmader, 2008; Schmeichel, 2007; 
Vohs, Baumeister, & Schmeichel, 2012). At the more general, trait, level of analysis, individuals 
who are dispositionally high in executive resources (cognitive capacity and/or volitional energy) 
have been found to be more effective in their interpersonal interactions and relationships, have 
better physical health and psychological well-being, and engage in more adaptive eating, 
drinking, and sexual behavior (Bertrams & Dickhäuser, 2009; Côté, Gyurak, & Levenson, 2010; 
Peluso, Ricciardelli, & Williams, 1999; Ryan & Frederick, 1997; Tangney, Baumeister, & 
Boone, 2004).  
Avoidance motivation and resource depletion 
 Engaging in self-regulation of any sort expends executive resources because it requires 
mental control and volitional energy to mobilize and sustain effort, to select goals and strategies 
that serve one’s enacted desires and fears, to shield perception and attention from the influx of 
competing demands, to monitor progress and adjust effort or attention as needed, to integrate and 
implement the processes necessary for effective task engagement, etcetera (Baumeister, 1998; 
Carver & Scheier, 1998; Fujita, 2011). Although all self-regulation expends resources to some 
degree, we posit that some forms of self-regulation are more depleting of executive resources 
than others.  
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In a recent article, Baumeister and Vohs (2007) stated that efficient and effective self-regulation 
entails the use of clear, well-defined standards, and indicated that self-regulation is made 
difficult when “ambiguous, uncertain, inconsistent, or conflicting” standards are used (p. 3). As 
detailed above, avoidance motivation does not afford clear, well-defined standards for efficient 
and effective regulation, and it also prompts processes that make self-regulation more arduous, 
more ambiguous, and, inherently, more aversive. Accordingly, we posited that avoidance-
motivated self-regulation is likely to be particularly resource depleting (Oertig, Schüler, 
Brandstätter, Roskes, and Elliot, (in press); Roskes et al., 2012; Roskes, Elliot, Nijstad, and De 
Dreu (2013). In the following, we overview two lines of recent research that support this 
proposition, the first does so indirectly and the second does so more directly.  
 Avoidance motivation under time pressure. conducted a series of studies designed to 
examine the effects of working memory under time pressure on different types of performance 
tasks. Time pressure requires individuals to carefully monitor task progress and the remaining 
time available, and working under time pressure is commonly experienced as stressful. As such, 
time pressure consumes executive resources (Keinan, Friedland, Kahneman, & Roth, 1999; 
Kelly, Jackson, & Hutson-Cameaux, 1997). As noted above, we contend that avoidance-
motivated self-regulation consumes an inordinate amount of cognitive and volitional resources. 
Accordingly, the combination of avoidance motivation and high time pressure would appear to 
represent a self-regulatory vulnerability, in that both are highly taxing of the limited executive 
resources available. In the Roskes et al. studies, we measured or manipulated type of motivation 
and manipulated level of time pressure and predicted that time pressure would have the strongest 
undermining influence on performance for avoidance-motivated individuals. Supportive data 
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would provide indirect evidence that avoidance motivation is indeed particularly depleting of 
executive resources. 
In a first study (with seventy-seven university undergraduates from The Netherlands), we 
assessed individual differences in avoidance motivation, manipulated time pressure, and 
examined the interactive effect of dispositional avoidance motivation (low vs. high) and time 
pressure (low vs. high) on performance on a creativity task. We assessed avoidance motivation 
with Elliot and Thrash’s (2010) avoidance temperament measure (sample item: “It is easy for me 
to imagine bad things that might happen to me”). Participants then completed the Remote 
Associates Test (RAT; Mednick, 1962), which is a creative insight task that requires individuals 
to identify associations between words that initially seem unrelated to each other;2 they were 
given three words such as care, swimming, and cue, and the task was to find a word related to 
each (pool). The RAT items were presented under either low time pressure (18 second per item) 
or high time pressure (8 seconds per item). Time pressure was a between-subjects variable.  
 The results revealed a main effect of time pressure, such that participants working under 
high time pressure performed worse on the RAT (β = -.36, p = .001). In addition, avoidance 
temperament was a negative predictor of RAT performance (β = -.30, p = .005), indicating that 
those higher in avoidance temperament did worse on the test. Most importantly, there was an 
avoidance temperament x time pressure interaction (B = -.53, p = .036). Simple slope analyses 
revealed that time pressure had no influence on performance for those low in avoidance 
temperament (β = -.33, p = .33), but did have an influence on performance for those high in 
avoidance temperament (β = -1.04, p < .001). Specifically, for those high in avoidance 
temperament, time pressure undermined performance attainment (see Figure 1).  
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In a subsequent study (with seventy-eight university undergraduates from The 
Netherlands), we manipulated, rather than measured, avoidance (and approach) motivation and 
examined the interactive effect of motivation (avoidance vs. approach) and time pressure (low 
vs. high) on performance on basic math problems. We manipulated motivation by varying the 
point structure for each randomly presented problem. For some problems, participants could lose 
a point if they provided an incorrect answer, but a correct answer would have no bearing on their 
score (avoidance condition); for other problems, participants could win a point if they provided a 
correct answer, but an incorrect answer would have not bearing on their score (approach 
condition). Participants were informed of the type of problem forthcoming by presenting a minus 
sign (avoidance) or a plus sign (approach) on the screen immediately before the problem 
appeared. The problems were eight straightforward math items such as 114/2 – 58 = ? (answer: -
1). The problems were presented under either low time pressure (18 second per item) or high 
time pressure (8 seconds per item). Motivation was a within-subjects variable and time pressure 
was a between-subjects variable. 
 The results revealed a main effect of time pressure, such that participants working under 
high time pressure performed worse on the math problems (F = 10.34, p = .002); there was no 
main effect of avoidance motivation (F = .02, p = .96). Most importantly, there was a motivation 
x time pressure interaction (F = 5.03, p = .028). Simple slope analyses revealed that time 
pressure had no influence on performance for those in the approach motivation condition (F = 
1.95, p = .17), but did have an influence on performance for those in the avoidance motivation 
condition (F = 14.58, p < .001). Specifically, for those in the avoidance motivation condition, 
time pressure undermined performance attainment (see Figure 2).  
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In a final study (with seventy-nine university undergraduates from the U.S.), we 
manipulated both motivation (avoidance vs. approach) and time pressure (low vs. high) and 
examined their interactive effect on performance on the d2 task (Brickenkamp & Zillman, 1998). 
This task was chosen because it requires careful, vigilant attention to detail, which should be an 
ideal fit to the type of processes evoked by avoidance motivation. We manipulated motivation 
using a variant of the owl-cheese maze manipulation from Friedman and Förster (2005). In this 
manipulation, participants are asked to look at a maze in which a cartoon mouse is depicted 
either trying to escape from an owl that hovers over the maze (avoidance condition) or trying to 
find a piece of cheese at the end of the maze (approach condition). They are instructed to write a 
vivid story from the mouse’s perspective about “the terrible death of the mouse” involving the 
mouse being caught, killed, and eaten (avoidance condition) or about the “happiest day in the life 
of the mouse” involving the mouse getting closer to the cheese, finding it, and eventually eating 
it. After writing the story, participants completed a computerized version of the d2 task, which 
entailed finding and cancelling target characters (e.g., a “d” with two dashes placed above and/or 
below it) that were interspersed with similar non-target characters (e.g., a “d” with a different 
number of dashes above and/or below it). The test was comprised of 14 series of characters, each 
of which contained two rows of 48 characters each. The task was presented under either low time 
pressure (20 second per item) or high time pressure (13 seconds per item). Both motivation and 
time pressure were between-subjects variables. 
 The results revealed a main effect for time pressure, such that participants working under 
high time pressure performed worse on the task (F = 276.36, p < .001); there was no main effect 
of avoidance motivation (F = .22, p = .64). Most importantly, there was a motivation x time 
pressure interaction (F = 4.89, p = .030). Simple slope analyses revealed that time pressure 
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undermined performance in the approach motivation condition (F = 106.31, p < .001), but this 
effect was even stronger for those in the avoidance motivation condition (F = 177.23, p < .001.  
In sum, the findings from the Roskes et al. (2013) research provide support for the idea 
that avoidance motivation is particularly depleting of executive resources. Performance under 
avoidance motivation appears to be fragile due to the amount of resources necessary to regulate 
in this fashion. A situational factor that additionally expends or limits resources, such as time 
pressure, exposes this fragility, as manifest in impaired performance. The empirical evidence 
from these studies indirectly supports the link between avoidance motivation and resource 
depletion; importantly, this is also the case for nearly all of the empirical work in the burgeoning 
“ego depletion” literature. That is, the “two-task” paradigm used in the majority of research in 
this area documents resource depletion indirectly by demonstrating impaired performance on a 
second task following an initial act of self-regulation. A few researchers have operationalized 
resource depletion more directly by assessing blood glucose levels (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007; 
Gailliot et al., 2007), and a few have utilized direct self-report measures of executive resources 
(Bertrams et al., 2011; Kerr, 2004). It is this latter approach that we utilized in the next set of 
studies that we overview. 
  Avoidance goal pursuit and self-regulatory resources. Oertig et al. (in press) conducted 
two studies designed to examine the concurrent and longitudinal influence of pursuing daily 
avoidance goals on self-regulatory resources. Daily goal regulation in general demands 
considerable cognitive and volitional resources. In accord with our analysis of the structure of 
avoidance motivation and processes emanating from avoidance regulation discussed above, we 
posit that avoid goal pursuit is related to a reduction in the perceived availability of regulatory 
resources. This decrement in resources may have deleterious downstream implications for 
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phenomenological outcomes such as subjective well-being (SWB), as prior research has shown a 
negative relation between resource depletion and well-being (Ciarocco, Sommer, & Baumeister, 
2001; Forstmeier, Drobetz, & Maercker, 2011; Kehr, 2004; Tangney et al., 2004). We examined 
this possibility in the second of the two studies, specifically testing self-regulatory resources as a 
mediator of the avoidance goal  SWB link.   
In a first study (with two hundred and eighty-three university undergraduates from 
Switzerland), we assessed participants’ daily avoidance (relative to approach) goals and their 
perceptions of their self-regulatory resources in the middle of a semester (Time 1), and then 
assessed their perceptions of their self-regulatory resources again one month later. We measured 
avoidance goals with a broad range of twenty-two goal statements that focused on academics, 
affiliation, and leisure. The goal statements juxtaposed avoidance-framed and an approach-
framed variants of the same content (e.g., “I really do not want to neglect my hobby activities 
[sports, music, theatre]” vs. “I really would like to have regular time for my hobby activities 
[sports, music, theatre]”), and participants were asked to select the variant that best matched their 
own goal pursuit (an option of “neither” was also provided). An avoidance goals measure was 
created by dividing the number of avoidance goal selections by the total number of goals 
selected. We assessed participants’ self-regulatory resources with a brief, four-item, face-valid 
measure focused on their current levels of self-discipline, concentration, stress-resistance, and 
physical energy.  
The results revealed a concurrent negative relation between daily avoidance goals and 
self-regulatory resources (r = -.21, p < .001); the higher the number of avoidance goals that 
participants pursued, the lower their perception of their resources. Most importantly, daily 
avoidance goals were a longitudinal predictor of change in self-regulatory resources across the 
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one month period (β = -.11, p = .016). Participants pursuing a higher number of avoidance goals 
evidenced a decrease in perceived resources over the month-long period. 
In a subsequent study (with one hundred and thirty-two university undergraduates from 
Switzerland), we examined the same set of relations investigated in the first study, but also 
included Time 1 and Time 2 SWB assessments to allow the following model to be tested: daily 
avoidance goals  self-regulatory resources  SWB. We assessed participants’ daily avoidance 
(relative to approach) goals, their perceptions of their self-regulatory resources, and their 
perceptions of their SWB one month prior to the end of a fall semester (Time 1), and then 
assessed their perceptions of their self-regulatory resources and SWB again one month later at 
the end of the semester (and the beginning of the Christmas holiday). We measured avoidance 
goals with a broad range of thirty-one goal statements that, as in the first study, focused on 
academics, affiliation, and leisure, but also focused on issues specific to the end of semester and 
the beginning of the Christmas period (e.g., completing class projects, taking exams, doing 
Christmas shopping, attending to family responsibilities). The manner of presenting and 
selecting the goals statements was the same as in the prior study. The measure of self-regulatory 
resources was the same as that used in the prior study. We assessed SWB with a composite score 
derived from measures of positive affect, negative affect (reversed), and life satisfaction.  
As in the prior study, the results revealed a concurrent negative relation between daily 
avoidance goals and self-regulatory resources (r = -.40, p < .001); the higher the number of 
avoidance goals that participants pursued, the lower their perception of their resources. The 
results also revealed a concurrent negative relation between daily avoidance goals and SWB (r = 
-.33, p < .001); the higher the number of avoidance goals that participants pursued, the lower 
their perceptions of SWB. More importantly, daily avoidance goals were a longitudinal predictor 
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of change in self-regulatory resources across the one month period (β = -.30, p < .001). 
Participants pursuing a higher number of avoidance goals evidenced a decrease in perceived 
resources over the month-long period. In addition, daily avoidance goals were a longitudinal 
predictor of change in SWB across the one month period (β = -.23, p = .001). Participants 
pursuing a higher number of avoidance goals evidenced a decrease in perceived SWB over the 
month-long period. Change in self-regulatory resources were a positive predictor of change in 
SWB, indicating that participants experiencing an decrease in resources also experienced a 
decrease in SWB over the month-long period. Finally, meditational analyses supported the 
proposed model. There was an indirect effect of avoidance goals on SWB via resources (β = -.09, 
p < .001) and the direct relation between avoidance goals and SWB dropped 52.2% when 
resources were taken into account (see Figure 3). In sum, the findings from these studies provide 
direct support for the idea that avoidance motivation is particularly depleting of executive 
resources, and the second study demonstrates that this resource depletion has important 
implications for well-being over time. 
Further considerations and broader implications 
The studies that we have overviewed represent both laboratory and field investigations of 
the link between avoidance motivation and the depletion of executive resources. In the rapidly 
expanding literature on resource depletion, nearly all of the research that has been conducted has 
utilized experimental methodologies under controlled laboratory settings. In light of this, the 
Oertig et al. (in press) findings may be seen as particularly noteworthy, in that they document the 
real-world generalizabilty of the resource depletion concept to the realm of everyday goal pursuit 
(see also Kehr, 2004). Furthermore, nearly all of the extant research in this literature has focused 
on the influence of self-regulation on resource depletion in the short-run, usually by testing the 
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influence of an initial, brief (e.g., ten minute) act of self-regulation on resource depletion on a 
second, equally brief act of regulation. Oertig et als’ longitudinal data demonstrates that ongoing 
regulation that is engaged in periodically over a protracted time (in this case, a month) also 
depletes resources. Indeed, it is possible that resource depletion effects accumulate over time, 
and may even be reciprocal and cyclical in nature. For example, pursuing daily avoidance goals 
leads to resource depletion, this initial resource depletion prompts additional self-protection 
concerns that prompt increased avoidance goal pursuit (Hobfoll, 1989; Schnelle et al., 2010), and 
this, in turn, leads to further resource depletion. Over time and repeated cycles, this process 
would undoubtedly lead to a pervasive and deep sense of fatigue, with likely downstream 
negative consequence for physical and mental well-being, and perhaps even chronic and clinical 
failures of self-regulation (e.g., obesity, alcohol abuse; Cox, Klinger, & Blount, 1991; Dickson, 
2006; Dickson & MacLeod, 2004).  
Self-control is a form of self-regulation that entails overriding a naturally occurring, 
prepotent response to a stimulus (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Schmeichel, 2007). The vast 
majority of the existing conceptual and empirical work on resource depletion focuses on this 
particular form of regulation (Fujita, 2011), which Muraven (2008) characterized as “an 
avoidance-oriented situation” (p. 769). We concur that self-control is a specific form of 
avoidance goal regulation, and think that viewing it in this way may clarify why it is such a 
difficult endeavor. Avoidance goals have two components -- 1) an aversive object, event, or 
possibility that is the focal point of the goal, and 2) a volitional commitment to move or stay 
away from that aversive object, event, or possibility (Elliot, 2008a). For the prototypic avoidance 
goal, an inherently aversive object, event, or possibility is appraised as undesirable, and the 
volitional commitment represents a natural propensity to evade the undesirable object, event, or 
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possibility. Self-control is different from the prototypic avoidance goal in that it requires an 
additional volitional step: an inherently appetitive object, event, or possibility much be 
reappraised as undesirable, and a volitional commitment is then made to move or stay away from 
it. Thus, the process of self-control may be seen as an unusually difficult form of avoidance 
regulation, and it is likely that this type of regulation is even more demanding than the 
prototypic, modal variant of avoidance regulation (Oertig et al., in press). From this standpoint, 
the prevalence of self-control failure should come as no surprise. 
In addition to contributing to the resource depletion literature, the conceptual ideas and 
empirical work described herein also contribute to the literature on approach-avoidance 
motivation, especially research on avoidance goal pursuit. As noted earlier, avoidance goal 
pursuit has been shown to have inimical consequences for many outcomes, including 
performance, intrinsic motivation, and, of course (as detailed herein), SWB (for reviews, see 
Elliot, 2008a; Elliot & Friedman, 2007). A number of different psychological processes have 
been shown to mediate these avoidance goal effects, including anxiety, task distraction, 
controlled volition, stress generation, and poor goal progress (for reviews, see Elliot & Friedman, 
2007; Elliot, Thrash, & Murayama, 2011). We think it likely that each of these process variables 
has deleterious consequences for outcomes because (at least in part) they deplete executive 
resources. For example, controlled volition (i.e., feeling internal or external pressure to exert 
effort -- “I must or ought to do this”) likely mediates the inimical influence of avoidance goals on 
subjective well-being (Elliot & Sheldon, 1998), because this controlled volitional regulation is 
highly depleting of executive resources and leaves the person feeling worn out and unfulfilled. 
More generally, we contend that resource depletion may be seen as the proximal mediator of a 
broad array of negative avoidance goal effects, with avoidance goal pursuit evoking distal 
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meditational processes such as anxiety, task distraction, and controlled volition, that in turn 
depletes executive resources, that, finally, proximally predicts the negative outcomes (Oertig et 
al., in press). In this type of sequential meditational model, executive resource depletion is a final 
common pathway through which other mediators exert their inimical effects. Subsequent 
research would do well to put this integrative meditational model to empirical test. 
Although we have concentrated nearly exclusively on the negative implications of 
avoidance motivation in this chapter, we hasten to add that avoidance motivation is not always 
deleterious for outcomes. Both approach motivation and avoidance motivation are clearly 
integral to and essential for effective psychological functioning in daily life. Empirical work on 
avoidance motivation has shown that it can be beneficial for certain types of tasks, in certain 
types of situations, and for certain types of individuals (Friedman & Förster, 2005; Higgins, 
2000; Hong & Lee, 2008; Koch et al., 2008; Muraven & Slessareva, 2003; Tamir, 2005; Roskes 
et al., 2012; Seibt & Förster, 2004). However, and importantly, even when it is necessary and 
even when it is beneficial, it expends an inordinate amount of executive resources. As such, even 
when avoidance motivation is beneficial in the short run, it is simultaneously exacting a cost in 
spent resources that, if sustained, undoubtedly has residual negative consequences in the long-
run (De Lange, Van Yperen, Van der Heijden, & Bal, 2010; Roskes et al., 2012; Ståhl, Van Laar, 
& Ellemers, 2012). In light of this, avoidance motivation seems best used (and encouraged) 
sparingly (Roskes, Elliot, Nijstad, & De Dreu, in press); problems ensue when it is hyper-
activated and over-utilized which, research suggests, is common in achievement settings, social 
settings, and daily goal pursuits (Elliot, 2006).   
In closing, the literatures on approach-avoidance motivation and on resource depletion 
have developed to the point that they are quite mature. Both literatures have contributed nicely to 
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our understanding of how the motivated self navigates and negotiates its way through the 
challenges of daily life. In this chapter, we have demonstrated how these two heretofore separate 
literatures may be integrated, with benefits for each. The essential message from this integration 
is that avoidance regulation is, simply put, exhausting.  
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Footnotes 
1. This chapter draws heavily on conceptual ideas developed and empirical work conducted 
by Oertig, Schüler, Brandstätter, Roskes, and Elliot, (in press), and Roskes, Elliot, 
Nijstad, and De Dreu (2013). 
2. In the experiments with the RAT, we used a thirty item measure that was divided, a 
priori, into three categories: 10 easy items, 10 moderately difficult items, and 10 difficult 
items. We expected to find results primarily on the moderately difficult items (see 
Roskes, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2012), due to likely ceiling and floor effects for the easy and 
difficult items, respectively. This is indeed what we found; there was considerable 
predictive utility with the moderately difficult items and very few effects with the easy 
and difficult items. As such, we focus on the moderately difficult items in the text 
(interested readers should feel free to contact the second author for details on the findings 
for the easy and difficult items).  
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Figure 1. Relations between avoidance temperament and the number of correctly solved Remote 
Associates Task (RAT) items. Figure used by permission of the publisher (to be determined). 
Avoidance motivation 31 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of correctly solved math items (+SE). Figure used by permission of the 
publisher (to be determined). 
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Figure 3. Standardized parameters for the hypothesized mediational model, with avoidance goals 
as the predictor, self-regulatory resources as the mediator and subjective well-being (SWB) as 
the dependent variable. + p < .10.  ** p < .01.  *** p < .001. Adapted figure used by permission 
of the publisher. 
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